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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE 
WORK PRACTICES: EVIDENCE FROM 
A LARGE GERMAN STEEL COMPANY
BERND J. FRICK, UTE GOETZEN, AND ROBERT SIMMONS*
The authors use monthly data from 25 production units in a Ger-
man steel plant over the period 1992 to 2001 to test for impacts of 
teamwork and performance-related pay on productivity, accidents, 
and absence rates. They find that teamwork and performance pay 
provide incentives to workers to increase quantity at the expense of 
quality and to run the machines for long hours instead of spending 
time on maintenance. Absenteeism increases when a combination 
of teamwork and performance pay is applied to production units 
that previously had neither. Results suggest that teamwork and per-
formance pay can create hidden costs for manufacturers and do not 
necessarily increase worker productivity.
[T]he development of an empirically grounded economic theory 
of incentives depends on research that combines the use of detailed 
knowledge of the organizational context, a carefully developed 
model that is appropriate to the context, and rich data drawn from 
within the organization under study. The search for research set-
tings with these key ingredients will . . . shape the continued devel-
opment of organizational economics.
Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001: 31)
Human resource management practices have changed radically over the past 20 years. Assembly line production organized hierarchically with 
well-defined line management in a top-down structure has given way to 
semiautonomous teams in which workers solve problems in groups and 
sometimes even set their own production targets (Bloom and van Reenen 
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2007). Innovations in human resource management are claimed to have 
been at least partly responsible for increased worker productivity in both 
the United States and Western Europe (Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson 2001; 
Black and Lynch 2004). Two particular innovations that we consider in this 
article are growth in use of semiautonomous teams, in a context of assembly 
line production, and use of bonuses for team performance (performance-
related pay).
We have disaggregated data on productivity, accidents, and absence rates 
from a large German steel company. Our focus on finely tuned data from 
within a large company enables us to analyze key variables with a precision 
that would be lacking in broader establishment-based surveys. As such our 
empirical analysis sits in the genre of nano-econometrics or “insider” econo-
metrics, which has grown in personnel economics following the seminal 
work on steel plants in the United States by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 
(1997) (see Lazear and Shaw 2007; Ichniowski and Shaw 2009; Shaw 2009; 
and Bloom and Van Reenen 2010 for surveys of the literature). This ap-
proach emphasizes rigorous econometric analysis of panel data generated 
within one company or a few companies. An important feature of this em-
pirical work has been the revelation that groups of human resource manage-
ment policies can raise productivity in steel plants by more than is possible 
from isolated policies. Thus, human resource management policies can de-
liver important complementarities in their effects on worker productivity. In 
our study, we focus on the ability of a combination of semiautonomous 
teamwork and group performance-related pay to raise productivity in a large 
German steel company. We also assess some hidden costs of human resource 
management policies, in the form of work accidents and absenteeism.
Literature Review
A substantial literature focusing on the impact of high-performance work 
practices on company performance has been published.1 For reasons dis-
cussed below we focus on performance-related pay (see Table A.1 in the 
Appendix)2 and on (semiautonomous) teams (see Table A.2).3 It appears 
that, first, the introduction not only of an individual pay-for-performance 
system but also of team bonuses increases worker productivity in various 
contexts (blue-collar workers, sales people, medical doctors) and, second, 
that the implementation of semiautonomous teams is also associated with 
statistically significant and economically relevant increases in either produc-
tivity or profitability. While the evidence on the separate effect of these two 
instruments seems to be convincing, effects are less clear when consider- 
ing “bundles” of human resource management practices, among which 
1 For summaries of the early literature see Huselid and Becker (1998), Ichniowski and Shaw (2003a), 
and Ichniowski et al. (1996).
2 Glassop (2002) provides an overview of the literature from a sociological perspective.
3 For an overview see Gibbons (1998, 2005), Prendergast (1996, 1998), and Jirjahn (2002).
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teamwork and bonus pay are particularly important. Summarizing the avail-
able evidence on the impact of innovative work practices on organizational 
performance, it appears that as expected—but irrespective of the concrete 
performance measures employed and the peculiar characteristics of the 
data sets used—specific work practices increase productivity, employee mo-
tivation, and/or profits mainly in the context of other specific practices. 
Unfortunately, however, little, if any, theoretical guidance is provided on 
how these measures interact. This, in turn, leads many researchers to search 
for combinations of practices that affect performance significantly in their 
data sets, but whose effects are idiosyncratic to that data and cannot be dem-
onstrated with data from other settings. Moreover, the possibility that firms 
already performing well have a greater probability to adopt “high perfor-
mance work practices”—either because they are able to bear the implemen-
tation costs or because they want to share rents with their employees—implies 
that the positive effect of innovative work practices on performance may not 
be causal but may simply reflect firm heterogeneity (Cappelli and Neumark 
2001). Not surprisingly, therefore, seemingly robust cross-sectional relation-
ships become small or even insignificant when panel data is used to account 
for unmeasured firm heterogeneity.4 Firms that adopt innovative work prac-
tices early are likely to do so because these practices are especially useful for 
them while those who adopt them later either decided to postpone their 
implementation because the practices have less value for them or because 
the implementation costs are likely to decrease over time.5
Finally, the discussion so far has not yet resulted in a consensus on the 
combination of measures that have to be implemented to build a high- 
performance work system. Our reading of the literature suggests that (semi-
autonomous) teams, on the one hand, and performance-related pay, on the 
other hand, are among the most important ingredients of any of the bun-
dles for which impact on firm performance is being analyzed in the litera-
ture. Admittedly, other human resource management practices have been 
studied in some detail too, but papers looking at the impact of (semiautono-
mous) teams and/or performance-related pay on either individual or firm 
productivity clearly dominate the literature. This does not imply, however, 
that other instruments such as safety regulations, information sharing, and 
feedback provision are unimportant. Given the emphasis that Jones, Kalmi, 
and Kauhanen (2010b) in their empirical analysis, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1995) in their theoretical exposition, and Lazear and Gibbs (2009) in their 
textbook place on the particular role of teams and bonus pay though, we 
will in our study concentrate on the separate as well as the joint impact of 
these two practices on the performance of individual production units in a 
4 Another reason cross-sectional relationships may become insignificant in panel data is measurement 
error.
5 Another interesting strand of the literature looks at the impact of “soft” human resource manage-
ment practices, such as development talks, participation, and feedback on worker productivity, and finds 
significantly positive effects, inter alia, for firms in the retail industry (see, e.g., Jones, Kalmi and 
Kauhanen 2006, 2010a).
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large German steel company while simultaneously controlling for the (po-
tential) influence of a large number of additional—yet (presumably) less 
important—measures.
A small number of studies have adopted a similar approach to the one we 
have chosen. In a truly seminal—but still not fully acknowledged—paper, 
Wagner, Rubin, and Callahan (1988) analyzed the impact of the introduc-
tion of nonmanagerial incentive pay in an iron foundry over an extended 
period of time (114 months between February 1975 and July 1984) on 
monthly productivity, labor costs, and grievance procedures. They find that 
the introduction of a group bonus increases average daily tonnage while 
labor costs declined and the number of grievance procedures remained 
constant; however, the impact of other changes in supervisory personnel 
and shop floor practices was not explicitly tested for.6 Hamilton, Nickerson, 
and Owan (2003) study the implementation of teamwork in a garment man-
ufacturing facility over a period of three years for which they have weekly 
information on 25 different teams. They find that, contrary to expectations, 
an individual worker’s productivity increases 14% after joining a semi-
autonomous team. Moreover, high-productivity workers do not reduce their 
effort levels when joining a team, while particularly low-productivity workers 
significantly increase their effort levels. In the firm under study, the imple-
mentation of semiautonomous teams was not accompanied by the simulta-
neous or subsequent introduction of a group bonus. Finally, Jones, Kalmi, 
and Kauhanen (2010b) use weekly records for four production lines in a 
Finnish food-processing plant during the period 1999 to 2005 to study the 
impact of semiautonomous teams, company-wide profit sharing, and a 
group system of performance-related pay on line productivity. They find 
that the effects vary considerably, first, across lines and, second, depending 
on the specific combination of human resource management practices, sug-
gesting the importance of complementarities.
Company Description
Company X is a large steel-producing company located in the federal state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. In September 2001 the company 
had about 2,500 employees of whom 1,700 were working in the production 
of autobody sheet steel as well as steel sheets designed for the production of 
cans for the soft-drink industry. About 60% of the annual production 
(900,000 tons per year) was exported. About half of the export went to Eu-
ropean countries. Turnover in 2001 was €770 million.
During the 1970s, Company X was one of the best performing firms in its 
sector with profits far above the industry average. During the 1980s, profits 
6 Moreover, Schuster (1983), Kaufman (1992) as well as Arthur and Aiman-Smith (2001) find that 
gainsharing (a team bonus covering the whole workforce of a particular company) has a significantly 
positive impact on productivity, employment, and employee suggestions. This effect, however, seems to 
vary considerably over time.
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declined dramatically due to a number of mergers, privatizations of for-
merly state-owned steel companies in Western European countries, the 
emergence of new competitors especially from Asia, and rising costs for en-
ergy as well as for wages.
In 1993 the company lost money for the first time in its history. Manage-
ment reacted with a massive layoff (1,000 employees, among them 100 
white-collar employees who were fired) and changed its policies fundamen-
tally:
1994: re-organization starts in the production units; requirement to meet 
particular production targets/goals,
1995: re-organization starts in administration,
1996: reduction of absenteeism is declared a “high priority” target, integra-
tion of formerly “independent” maintenance workers in shift teams,
1997: stepwise introduction of new bonus system, training in workplace 
safety and accident prevention, bonus system for reduced absenteeism, 
monitored requirement to wear hard hats,
1998: introduction of appraisal interviews, introduction of extended em-
ployee suggestion system,
1999: stepwise introduction of semiautonomous teams in production for the 
purpose of problem-solving activities, flexible job assignments, and 
quality management, and
2000: safety staff explicitly authorized to issue directives toward employees 
for violations of safety regulations.
According to the company’s top management these changes resulted in a 
34% increase in gross output and a 40% increase in productivity (tons pro-
duced per hour) in 2001 as compared to 1993. Since 2002 the company is 
highly profitable again.
The teams whose performance we study consist of approximately 80 to 
300 members who are very homogenous with regard to their qualifications 
but often heterogeneous with regard to their age and/or their tenure.7 Be-
cause voluntary employee turnover in Company X is close to zero—the firm 
pays about 15 to 20% more than what workers could earn elsewhere in the 
mainly rural area where the firm is located8—mutual monitoring plays an 
important role in the daily interaction of the production workers; “un-
cooperative” workers are likely to be punished by their peers (Kandel and 
Lazear 1992; Knez and Simester 2001). At the same time, however, the high 
degree of “cohesiveness” of the individual teams creates the conditions 
7 The teams are identical to what we call “production units.” Each team consists of up to five different 
“shift groups” (between four and five different shifts are required for continuous production under the 
35-hour work week stipulated by the collective bargaining agreement in the steel industry); the size of the 
semiautonomous teams working in close collaboration varies between 20 and 60 people.
8 Traditionally, the collective bargaining agreements in the metal and steel industries stipulate hourly 
wage rates that are considerably higher than in most other industries. Therefore, the majority of workers 
in Company X are interested in retaining their jobs until they reach retirement age.
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under which “collusive behavior,” such as “voluntary” absenteeism, is likely 
to occur (see, e.g., the seminal studies by Roy 1952, 1954).
The number of work accidents in Company X was far lower than in the 
metal industry as a whole (10 accidents per 1,000 full-time employees com-
pared with 52 in 2001, see Table 1) and the absence rate was also consider-
ably lower (3.2% compared with 5.5% in 2001, see Table 2). These figures 
are surprising insofar as
1)  absence rates increase with firm size (Barmby and Stephan 2000; 
Heywood and Jirjahn 2004) and Company X is a rather large firm, and
2)  workplace accidents decrease with firm size, which explains the lower 
number of accidents in Company X. At the same time, however, the 
number of accidents is much lower than in other firms in the industry 
suggesting that worker and supervisor training as well as the company’s 
investments in workplace safety seem to pay off.
Workers receive a flat hourly rate supplemented, for some production units, 
by a bonus payment related to production unit output. A “cap” is imposed 
Table 1. Work Accidents in Germany 
per 1,000 Workers, 1993–2001
Year All sectors Metal industry Firm X
1993 52 70 25
1994 51 69 36
1995 48 67 61
1996 43 58 24
1997 42 58 22
1998 42 57 13
1999 41 58 11
2000 40 55  9
2001 39 52 10
Sources: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialord-
nung (2001: 143–45); own calculations.
Note: Accidents that have to be reported per 1,000 full-
time employees.
Table 2. Absenteeism in Germany, 1996–2001
Year All sectors Metal industry Firm X
1996 4.8 5.4 3.4
1997 4.2 5.2 3.3
1998 4.1 5.2 3.5
1999 4.3 5.6 3.3
2000 4.2 5.5 3.3
2001 4.2 5.5 3.2
Sources: Küsgens, Vetter, and Yoldas (2001: 264, 402); own 
calculations.
Note: Hours of absence as percentage of potential work-
ing hours.
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on the bonuses to be obtained by the individual teams. Bonus payments 
cannot exceed a threshold level of 140% of regular hourly wages multiplied 
by average monthly working hours. Also, bonuses accrue to the team, not 
the individual. We should stress that the company explicitly wanted to re-
duce absenteeism and implemented bonus payments precisely as an in-
tended incentive to reduce absences. A “present at work” bonus was installed 
alongside the bonus for production performance.
Note that management–labor relations have been rather peaceful in 
Company X: The works council maintains a cooperative relationship with 
top management, management consults the works council even on issues 
for which this is not stipulated by the Codetermination Act to gain approval 
or active support for its decisions, and trade union influence is limited (al-
though most works councillors are members of IG Metall, the largest metal 
workers’ union in Europe).
Theoretical Considerations
Since the steel company that we are analyzing has assembly line production, 
the whole line could be thought of as a team. The organization of work 
around small- to medium-sized teams is best considered as an attempt to 
raise worker productivity by capturing the benefits of specialization and skill 
complementarities within groups. These benefits can be reinforced by 
learning spillovers and knowledge transfer as team members gain experi-
ence that can be shared within the group. For these effects to be realized, 
team size should be sufficiently small so that workers are aware of each oth-
ers’ skills and performances, and team members should be located in close 
proximity at the workplace (Neilson 2007).
A series of empirical studies documents the benefits of teamwork in 
terms of enhanced worker productivity (see Lazear and Shaw 2007 for a 
survey). Thus, teams are found to raise productivity through worker com-
plementarity in production of clothing (Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 
2003), to raise communication levels in steel mills (Ichniowski and Shaw 
2003b), and to facilitate solutions of complex problems, again in steel mills 
(Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007). In their seminal study of U.S. steel 
mills,  Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) found that early on in the 
application of new human resource management practices in the U.S. steel 
industry, such policies raised worker productivity and, crucially, that the 
marginal benefit of each practice was increasing in the adoption of other 
practices. More recently, Boning et al. (2007) were able to distinguish be-
tween gross output and output net of scrap in a panel study of several U.S. 
steel plants. They found that combinations of human resource manage-
ment policies were generally able to raise output net of scrap, that is, qual-
ity-adjusted output.
Team production does not necessarily imply the use of incentive pay, but 
bonuses for team performance are widely used in modern manufacturing 
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companies. Such bonuses enable workers and firms to share rents; bonuses 
also help alleviate worker concerns over inequity in pay in firms and promote 
perceptions of fairness, which in turn raise worker satisfaction and morale 
(Petrescu and Simmons 2008). These features could in principle translate 
into increased team productivity.
The potential problems for team incentives in the form of performance-
related pay are well-documented (Neilson 2007). First, individual workers 
bear the cost (disutility) of their own effort but all team members benefit 
through performance-related pay. Team incentives tend to dilute the salary 
gains from work and could lead to minimal amounts of team effort as a re-
sult. Second, a free-rider problem can occur in teams. Individuals who offer 
low levels of effort get the same rewards as colleagues who perform high 
levels of effort. Third, much depends on finding a measure of team perfor-
mance that workers and firms can agree on. For workers, this means a set of 
operationally feasible production targets that can trigger bonuses; for firms, 
targets should be appropriate to the broader profit goal of the organization 
as a whole. Production targets should also not be too soft, so that credible 
incentives can be established.
In contrast, decentralizing decision-making to teams might generate pos-
itive effects on productivity (as well as on behavioral aspects) by increasing 
employee discretion, which allows more efficient use of private information; 
by increasing employee effort and improving their attitudes toward work; 
and by encouraging team members to learn from one another and generate 
new knowledge (for a summary of the relevant literature see, e.g., Jones, 
Kalmi, and Kauhanen 2010b). Effective decentralization of decision-making 
often requires the adoption of complementary team incentives, because the 
“coupling of financial incentives with teamwork may provide the right in-
centives for employees both to engage in peer monitoring and to refrain 
from opportunistic use of increased employee discretion” (Jones et al. 
2010b: 612). Thus, it is precisely the combination of team incentives and 
decentralized decision-making in the form of semiautonomous teams that 
can be thought to solve the problems that typically arise when close coop-
eration between teammates is likely to increase productivity and when, at 
the same time, peer monitoring is required to avoid “free-riding” by utility-
maximizing individuals.
Our empirical analysis seeks to identify some potentially hidden costs of 
team production and performance-related pay. Taken singly or jointly, these 
human resource policies could lead to an excessive focus by workers on total 
output that might be rewarded by incentive pay. Quality of output and care 
over maintenance may be sacrificed as workers perform excessive effort in a 
drive to meet production targets that trigger performance bonuses. If these 
bonuses are not modified to control for quality of output then teamwork 
and performance-related pay could result in lower rather than higher team 
productivity. Also, if team members work excessively hard without sufficient 
care then increased work accidents could follow.
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Model, Estimation Methods, and Data
We define ABSENCE RATE as the proportion of potential worker-hours in a 
production unit declared by the firm as absences in a given month. This is 
modeled by:
(1) ABSENCE RATE = + + +
+ +
β0 β β β
β β
1 2PLD MONTH YEAR
PERSONNEL MANAGER T
3
4 5 ECHNICAL MANAGER
SHIFT HRM+ + + +
+
β β6 7 β β
β
8 9TENURE PERFORMANCE








ABSENCE RATE is the proportion of potential worker-hours in a production 
unit declared by the firm as absences in a given month;
PLD is a vector of production line dummies;
MONTH is a vector of month dummies;
YEAR is a vector of year dummies;
PERSONNEL MANAGER is a vector of dummy variables denoting the identi-
ties of personnel managers directly responsible for the pay and employ-
ment conditions of the units of workers;9
TECHNICAL MANAGER is a vector of dummy variables denoting the identi-
ties of technical managers responsible for the production operations of 
the shifts to which the units of workers belong;
SHIFT is a vector of five shift dummies;
HRM is a vector of variables denoting combinations of human resource 
management practices, derived from factor analysis;10
TENURE is the average length of tenure with the firm of each production 
unit; we predict that units with longer-lasting employment relations 
with the firm will have greater experience and will wish to sustain mutu-
ally beneficial employment relationships with the firm, resulting in 
lower absence rates;
9 Since personnel and technical managers rotate across production units, teams experience changes in 
their supervisory staff from time to time. We take this into account by controlling for the identities of the 
five personnel managers and the five technical managers in charge of the 25 production units.
10 The results can be obtained from the authors on request. The number of dummy variables included 
in this first factor analysis was 15, resulting in a varimax rotated factor matrix consisting of three compo-
nents with eigenvalues >1. These factors can be described as follows: (1) action programs to increase 
workplace safety (representing 8 different variables: publication of first safety handbook; target: zero 
accidents; obligation to wear hard hats; general training of safety staff; suggestion scheme: accident re-
duction; target: absenteeism; implementation of absence bonus; target: accident prevention); (2) infor-
mation and directives (representing 5 different variables: publication of second safety handbook; target: 
absence days; special training of safety staff; authorization of safety staff to issue directives; safety training 
of new employees); and (3) worker training to increase safety (representing 2 different variables for 
safety trainings of special groups of workers). About 76% of the variance can be explained by the three 
factors.
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PERFORMANCE PAY is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a production unit 
receives some part of their pay as a performance-related component 
and no teamwork is involved (note that our human resource policy 
dummy variables are deliberately designed to be mutually exclusive);
TEAMWORK is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if members of a production 
unit work jointly as a team and no performance pay is involved;
TEAMWORK*PERFORMANCE PAY is an interactive dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if members of a production unit work as a team and receive 
some performance-related component to their pay; and
H is an i.i.d stochastic term.
To investigate the effects of teamwork and performance pay on absentee-
ism, we model ABSENCE RATE as a continuous variable as shown in Equa-
tion (1). Since our dependent variable is a rate that is bounded between 0 
and 1, we need to estimate a fractional response model along the lines pro-
posed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008). Papke and Wooldridge apply 
fractional response model estimation to employee participation rates in 
pension plans (1996) and school test pass rates (2008). Our dependent vari-
able is similar. Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2009) show that fractional re-
sponse models can be estimated by general linearized models. Specifically, 
Table 3. Work Accidents and Absence Rates 
in Firm X, 1993–2001
Year
Work accidents per 
1,000 full-time employees
Number of working days lost 
due to accidents, per employee Absence rate
1993 25.2 (157.1) 0.51  (1.91) —
1994 36.2 (186.8) 1.27  (5.14) —
1995 61.3 (240.1) 2.84 (12.80) —
1996 23.6 (151.9) 1.73 (10.12) 3.39 (3.12)
1997 22.0 (157.2) 1.30  (6.97) 3.33 (2.96)
1998 12.6 (111.5) 0.91  (6.30) 3.46 (3.49)
1999 11.0 (104.4) 0.85  (8.45) 3.32 (3.51)
2000  9.4  (96.7) 0.42  (4.01) 3.29 (3.38)
2001 10.5 (102.0) 0.40  (3.74) 3.22 (3.22)
Note: Values indicate mean (standard deviation).
Table 4. Distribution of Monthly Observations with/without 











Neither teamwork nor performance pay 68.8 52.1 70.6
Performance pay only 19.6 25.0 15.7
Teamwork only  1.5  6.5  3.9
Teamwork with performance pay 10.1 16.4  9.9
N 2,700 3,180 5,088
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the results from the fractional response model of Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) can be replicated using the glm command in Stata. We apply this ap-
proach to our absence rate variable. Absence data are available on a unit/
shift basis but only from October 1996, and we have 60 monthly observa-
tions of absence rates per unit/shift, giving a potential number of 3,180. 
Missing values mean our absence rate data are recorded for 3,001 shift-unit 
observations. Table 3 offers descriptive data for work accidents and absences.
For production unit-month observations where absences were recorded 
we find 25.0% with performance pay only, 16.4% with teamwork only, and 
6.5% with teamwork and performance pay. Hence, 52.1% of observations 
had neither teamwork nor performance pay (see Table 4 for information on 
the distribution of the four regimes and Figure 1 for an illustration of the 
distribution of teamwork and performance pay across the units of analysis).
As noted above, to claim bonus pay, production units might perform 
excessive effort leading to lack of care over safety resulting in greater fre-
quency of accidents. We have two measures of accidents in the firm. ACCI-
DENTS is number of accidents by production unit and WORKING DAYS 
LOST is production days lost from accidents. We set up the following 
model. For numbers of accidents, zeros represent 86% of observations and 
OLS estimation would be inappropriate. Days lost due to accidents have 
discrete values and we categorize these as 0, 1, or 2 days lost, 3 days lost, 
and 4 or more days lost. We proceed to estimate these categories by fixed 
effects conditional logit. Fixed effects models do not necessarily deliver 
consistent estimates in ordered or binary probit models. Chamberlain 
(1980) proposed a binary response fixed effects logit model in which bi-
ases were eliminated. More recent analysis has developed ordered logit 
models with fixed effects. In particular, we use the Blow-up and Cluster 
estimator proposed by Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann (2011) and 
applied with Stata code by Dickerson, Hole, and Munford (2011). This es-
timator adjusts standard errors for clustering by group and does not suffer 
from the potential problems of the Chamberlain estimator associated with 
some cutoffs in the ordering leading to small sample sizes. This is a poten-
tial problem in our case as accidents have a skewed distribution. We also 
estimated an alternative count data model, fixed effects zero inflated nega-
tive binomial regression, and this gave similar results to fixed effects or-
dered logit. Our model is
Figure 1. The “Timing” of the Introduction of Teamwork and Performance Pay
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We have 96 monthly observations for accidents by unit/shift over the period 
October 1993 to September 2001 giving a potential number of observations 
of 5,088. Dropped from the estimation were 403 observations because there 
was no variation over time in the outcome variable for some groups. This 
leaves 4,685 observations for estimation.
Next, we assess the impacts of performance pay and teamwork on pro-
duction line performance. This is measured by realized output, RO, of each 
of the 25 production units working in the company. Our data allow us to 
distinguish output of sufficient quality to be available for sale, adjusted out-
put denoted by AO. This is quality-adjusted output, which is output net of 
waste scrap. The waste scrap cannot be sold but can be recycled back into 
further production. Further measures of production unit performance are 
RT, which is running time of the production line and ART, which is ad-
justed running time, net of time taken for unscheduled maintenance of the 
line. We estimate the following fixed effects models:




















TEAMWORK TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE PAY+ +β ε31 *
where ORG CHANGE is a vector of variables denoting technical and organi-
zational changes, derived from factor analysis.11,12
11 The results are also available on request. The number of dummy variables included in this second 
factor analysis was 23, resulting in a varimax rotated factor matrix consisting of 6 components with eigen-
values >1. These factors can be described as follows: (1) training and reorganization measures (repre-
senting 5 different human resource management practices: integration of shift coordinators into shift 
teams; extended training of production workers; integration of mechanics and electricians into shift 
teams; action program to increase output; and introduction of additional quality measures); (2) organi-
zational decentralization (representing 7 different instruments: cross-linking of production teams; intro-
duction of autonomous maintenance; introduction of performance appraisal of shift leaders; 
decentralization of suggestion scheme; action program to increase capacity utilization; integration of 
repair services into shift teams; and introduction of fifth shift); (3) training and evaluation (representing 
5 different instruments: integration of locksmiths into shift teams; extended quality training of produc-
tion workers; training of production workers in electrical engineering; introduction of “shift talks”; and 
presentation of pilot project on capacity utilization); (4) evaluation and quality management (represent-
ing 2 different measures: introduction of “round table” for shift leaders; start of quality training); (5) new 
performance measures (representing 2 different instruments: introduction of service technicians; 
change in performance calculations); and (6) reallocation of technical staff (representing 2 different 
measures: reallocation of coordinating staff; separation of hood-type furnaces). About 77% of the vari-
ance can be explained by the 6 factors.
12 The reason we had to replace HRM (the vector of variables denoting combinations of human re-
source management practices derived from factor analysis) in models 1 and 2 by ORG CHANGE in 
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For productivity measures,13 we have data from 25 different production 
units. Productivity is recorded only at the level of the production unit; no 
further disaggregation is possible. We have 108 monthly observations over 
the period October 1992 to September 2001, giving a maximum of 2,700 
observations. Some missing values reduce the sample sizes to 2,673 for ac-
tual output, 2,676 for adjusted output and running time, and 2,006 for ad-
justed running time. Out of 25 production units, 13 delivered data on 
accidents (numbers and working days lost). Estimation of Equation (3) al-
lows us to test for impacts of performance-related pay and teamwork on 
output and running time. Although we might predict that firms introduce 
teamwork and performance-related pay precisely in order to increase these 
measures, evidence is far from unanimous in revealing beneficial effects of 
these mechanisms.
Results
Coefficients of focus variables are reported in Table 5. By themselves, team-
work and performance pay each have significant negative effects on absence 
rates. But teamwork combines with performance pay to significantly raise 
absence rates. To assess the combined effects of teamwork and performance 
pay we use the separate teamwork and performance pay dummy variables 
plus their interaction term as follows.14 We can rewrite Equation (1) as:
ABSENCE RATE b b PERFORMANCE PAY




2 3 * ORMANCE
PAY c+ ’ .Z Zwhere is a vector of controls
Recall that the performance pay, teamwork, and interaction variables are 
defined to be mutually exclusive. Then b1 is the effect of performance pay 
without teamwork, b2 is the effect of teamwork without performance pay, 
and b3 is the effect of having both teamwork and performance pay relative 
to having neither. Moreover, (b3 – b1) is the effect of adding teamwork to a 
unit that already had performance pay and (b3 – b2) is the effect of adding 
performance pay to a unit that already had teamwork. The significance of 
these last two effects can be evaluated using Wald tests.
model 3 is that the two data sets the company made available to us include different sets of (potential) 
determinants of absenteeism and accidents, on the one hand, and productivity and downtime, on the 
other hand. We admit, however, that either of these variables could affect each of our performance mea-
sures.
13 Strictly speaking, we cannot calculate the productivity of the individual units because we can neither 
control for the number of workers nor for the number of hours used to generate the observed output 
and the observed running time. Given the information we have received from workers during our plant 
visits, however, we assume that differences in output and running time are due to time-invariant differ-
ences in team size and composition. Thus, we assume that the production unit fixed effects capture most 
of the differences in inputs.
14 We are grateful to ILRReview editor Lawrence Kahn for suggesting this procedure.
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Table 5 reveals that, on their own, teamwork and performance pay lead 
to reduced absence rates. Wald tests of the restriction that the difference of 
the interaction term coefficient and an individual human resource policy 
coefficient is equal to zero clearly reject the null (p values of 0.00 in each 
case). Hence, we conclude that adding teamwork to a unit that already has 
performance pay and adding performance pay to a unit that already has 
teamwork does result in a statistically significant increase in absence rate. 
Furthermore, adding performance pay and teamwork to a unit that has nei-
ther is shown to have a significant positive effect on absence rate. The size of 
this effect can be evaluated by computing predicted mean absence rates, 
using Stata’s margins command. The baseline predicted absence rate with 
no teamwork and no performance pay system is 3.32%. When teamwork 
and performance pay are introduced together the predicted absence rate 
rises to 4.01%.
Drawing from a sample of German manufacturing firms, Heywood and 
Jirjahn (2004) observed that firms using teamwork had lower absence rates. 
This was attributed to larger costs of absence with teamwork and increased 
incentives to use monitoring to deter absence and reduce costs. Our results 
are consistent with Heywood and Jirjahn to some extent since we find that 
our firm is predicted to experience reduced absenteeism when it introduces 
teamwork without performance pay.
Our finding of an adverse effect on absenteeism from a combination of 
human resource policies is a new result to the literature on the effects of 
such practices on organizational performance. We suggest a hidden cost to 
Table 5. Impact of Teamwork and Performance 
Pay on Absence Rates
Variable GLM coefficient
Average age of workers –0.017
(–2.64)




Teamwork with performance pay 0.194
(2.72)
Factor 1: Action programs –0.205
(–1.93)
Factor 2: Information and directives –0.290
(–3.02)
Factor 3: Safety training –0.002
(–0.10)
N 3,001
Notes: Dependent variable is absence rate measured as total 
hours absent as proportion of maximum working hours by 
production unit. Estimates are from GLM regression with 
robust standard errors, with dummy variables for month 
and year, and with hours of work to account for the size of 
the production units; z-values in parentheses.
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human resource management practices occurs. Teamwork and perfor-
mance pay appear to promote shirking in the form of absenteeism, com-
pared to a situation in which neither policy is in place. Of course, it is 
possible that teams can generate spare effort so as to be able to cover ab-
sence of teammates and continue the production process without undue 
disruption. Then shirking and absenteeism can co-exist with higher produc-
tivity. Our analysis refers to production units across a particular firm, and 
there is no reason to expect that results from a panel of firms should corre-
spond to results from a panel of production units within a firm.
One reason for why a combination of performance pay and teamwork 
leads to increased absenteeism is that, with teamwork, production units can 
cover for absent colleagues. For example, workers can alternate who takes an 
unauthorized day of absence each month knowing that colleagues will con-
ceal this from the company. Also, with performance pay, workers have the 
incentive, as well as the means, to take unauthorized absence as the bonus 
payment is capped at 140% x regular hourly wage x average monthly working 
hours. Presence at work, and hence absence rate, is partly a function of the 
remaining output that is required to reach maximum earnings possible 
under the bonus cap. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that 75% of all work 
accidents happen in the first half of each month (when workers are eagerly 
trying to meet their production targets) while more than 70% of all absence 
days (net of days lost due to work accidents) occur in the second half of the 
month (when workers anticipate that they will be able to meet these targets).
Perhaps surprisingly, the combined effects of action programs to increase 
workplace safety, of providing detailed information and issuing directives, as 
well as from worker safety trainings turn out to be of minor importance 
only. The coefficient of the second variable is statistically significant while 
the other two are insignificant.15
Table 6 reports estimates of coefficients from a fixed effects ordered logit 
model of number of accidents and days lost due to accidents. Results in 
both columns of Table 6 are remarkably similar and consistent. Production 
units with greater average age of workforce are significantly associated with 
greater probability of zero days lost through accidents and lower probability 
of one or more days. This result is consistent with the notion that more ex-
perienced production units are more careful, make fewer mistakes, and 
cause less production disruption through accidents than less experienced 
units. To some extent, an element of self-selection takes place here in that 
workers who are perceived to be careless are likely to have been fired, or 
encouraged to leave, by the company. Moreover, production units that work 
longer hours are associated with higher probabilities of positive accidents 
and positive days lost through accidents. The coefficients on teamwork and 
performance pay, however, are insignificant throughout, whether consid-
ered singly or jointly.
15 The implementation of safety programs could have been influenced by a previous change in acci-
dent rates. This makes it difficult to reveal an effect of action programs, even in a fixed effects model.
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Since the firm’s contributions to the accident insurance fund are 
experience-rated and increase nearly exponentially with the number of ac-
cidents reported, investing in workplace safety is likely to pay off even in our 
Company X that reports a below average number of accidents per year.
Therefore, performance pay, with or without teamwork, is not signifi-
cantly related to an increase in accident-related loss of production. Our pro-
posed rationalization of this effect is that accidents in the Company X steel 
plant are indeed random. The company has succeeded in avoiding system-
atic causes of accidents attributable to behavior induced by its human re-
source management policies and is unable to reduce accidents any further, 
other than by retaining older workers and keeping work hours below exces-
sive levels.
So far we have found that teamwork combined with performance pay 
raises absence rates while performance pay, with or without teamwork, does 
not raise the likelihood of disruption to production because of accidents. 
We turn, finally, to our productivity models. Descriptive evidence of the ef-
fects of teamwork and/or performance pay on productivity of units is pro-
vided in the box plots displayed in Figures 2 to 5.
Column 1 of Table 7 reveals that realized output increases for units that 
have performance pay (but not teamwork) by about 1.8% (both output 
measures are normalized with their respective mean equal to zero).16 This 
effect is reinforced when performance pay is combined with teamwork (plus 
3.4%). Adding teamwork to a unit that already has performance pay results 
in significantly greater realized output (p value of 0.002 from a Wald test). 
16 The company did not have an explicit performance appraisal system for its production units. If re-
cent changes in unit productivity led management to adopt teamwork for that unit then we may be esti-
mating a spurious relationship between adoption and post-adoption productivity. If adoption decisions 
were imposed arbitrarily without a formal review of the unit’s performance trend then the adoption of a 
human resource management practice for a given production unit is more likely to be exogenous with 
respect to that unit. Informal conversations with company managers lead us to this latter view.
Table 6. Fixed Effects Conditional Logit Coefficients for 
Probability of Accidents and Days Lost through Accidents
Variable Accidents Days lost
Age –0.080 (2.46) –0.079 (2.44)
Hours 0.00044 (3.43) 0.00044 (3.09)
Performance pay only 0.161 (0.64) –0.246 (0.67)
Teamwork only 0.118 (0.30) 0.156 (0.53)
Teamwork with performance pay 0.118 (0.30) 0.082 (0.24)
N of outcomes 4,685 4,685
Notes: Dependent variables are probability of number of accidents and probabil-
ity of days lost. Estimates are coefficients from fixed effects ordered logit regres-
sions with dummy variables for month and year and with working hours to 
control for the size of the production units and three factors representing a 
wide range of safety practices (n = 15). Estimates are by Blow up and Cluster 
procedure in Stata 12; z-values in parentheses.
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Figure 2. Box Plot of Realized Output by Type of Work Organization
Figure 3. Box Plot of Adjusted Output by Type of Work Organization
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Figure 4. Box Plot of Running Time by Type of Work Organization
On its own, teamwork has no statistically significant impact on realized out-
put. Adding performance-related pay to a unit that has teamwork delivers 
significantly higher gross output from production units (p value of 0.023). 
However, when output is adjusted for waste scrap the picture changes radi-
cally. Column 2 of Table 7 shows that neither teamwork nor performance 
pay, nor the combination of the two, deliver significantly greater adjusted 
output. Adding teamwork to a unit with performance pay does not lead to 
significantly greater adjusted output (p value of 0.117). Similarly, adding 
performance pay to a unit with teamwork does not result in significantly 
greater adjusted output (p value of 0.094). Our results here run counter to 
the findings of Ichniowski et al. (1997) and Boning et al. (2007) for U.S. 
steel plants; we do not find evidence of genuine productivity gains in our 
particular German steel company through either teamwork or performance 
pay or the combination of these.
Column 3 of Table 7 reveals that the application of performance pay on 
its own is associated with longer machine running times (plus 2.2%; again, 
both measures are normalized with their mean equal to zero). On its own, 
teamwork is associated with shorter running time (minus 4.1%). Adding 
teamwork to a unit with performance pay has no statistically significant im-
pact on operating time (p value of 0.108 from a Wald test). Adjusted run-
ning time takes account of down time required for unscheduled 
maintenance. Correcting for maintenance time (column 4 of Table 7), we 
find that teamwork, without performance-related pay, is associated with 
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lower adjusted running time (minus 5.4%). Also, adding teamwork to a unit 
with performance pay leads to a significant loss of adjusted running time. 
Teamwork combined with performance pay results in adjusted running 
time of minus 4.1%, compared with absence of each policy.
The 23 additional (and presumably less important) human resource 
management practices that have been introduced in Company X during the 
period under investigation and summarized in six different variables de-
rived from factor analysis seem to have no clear-cut impact on either output 
or running time: While training and reorganization measures, organiza-
tional decentralization, and training and evaluation measures have a statisti-
cally significant yet economically moderate positive effect on gross output, 
this effect is statistically significant but negative for the former two variables 
in the remaining three models (adjusted output, running time, and ad-
justed running time). The coefficients of evaluation and quality manage-
ment measures, new performance metrics, and reallocation of technical 
Figure 5. Box Plot of Adjusted Running Time by Type of Work Organization
where 1 = neither teamwork nor performance pay
2 = teamwork only
3 = performance pay only
4 = teamwork with performance pay
The mean differences of the normalized output and running time measures are always statistically sig-
nificant:
Realized output: F = 22.3, p < .01
Adjusted output: F = 18.0, p < .01
Running time: F = 13.6, p < .01
Adjusted running time: F = 3.2, p < .05
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staff exhibit a similar inconsistent pattern across the four models (4 out of 
12 coefficients are not statistically significant and 6 of the statistically signifi-
cant 8 coefficients have the “wrong” sign, indicating a negative instead of a 
positive impact on either output or running time).17
Overall, the results from Table 7 suggest that teamwork and performance 
pay provide incentives to workers to raise production quantity at the ex-
pense of quality and also serve to run the machines for longer hours instead 
of spending sufficient time on maintenance. The steel company has used 
gross output as its measure by which performance pay is calculated and this 
appears to have been a mistaken policy, because “people respond as strongly 
to badly designed incentives as they do to well-structured ones. And when 
those badly designed incentives are strong, they can lead to really egregious 
17 Additional estimations (not reported here but available from the authors on request) reveal that, 
first, the main effects (i.e., teamwork and bonus payments) are statistically insignificant in most cases (6 
out of 8 coefficients fail to reach statistical significance) when a linear time trend is introduced in the 
estimations. Second, interacting the joint effect of teamwork and bonus payments with a linear and a 
quadratic time trend indicates that in two models (running time and adjusted running time) the effect 
is initially negative but becomes positive after some “learning period” of 84 and 95 months. This seems 
to suggest that the costs of implementing certain human resource management practices may have been 
underestimated so far.










Tenure 0.003 0.033 –0.006 –0.0011
(0.91) (3.41) (–1.69) (–2.02)
Performance pay only 0.018 0.006 0.022 –0.001
(3.61) (0.35) (3.45) (–0.11)
Teamwork only 0.011 –0.023 –0.041 –0.054
(1.18) (–0.72) (–3.35) (–3.02)
Teamwork with performance pay 0.034 0.033 0.011 –0.041
(4.99) (1.46) (1.24) (–2.62)
Factor 1: Training and Reorganization 0.018 –0.044 –0.022 –0.034
(3.03) (–2.18) (–2.84) (–2.64)
Factor 2: Organizational Decentralization 0.013 –0.063 –0.024 –0.038
(2.18) (–3.19) (–3.22) (–3.26)
Factor 3: Training and Evaluation 0.013 0.034 0.013 –0.007
(6.92) (5.19) (5.38) (–1.72)
Factor 4: Evaluation and Quality Management –0.000 –0.036 –0.017 0.003
(–0.11) (–5.26) (–6.26) (0.64)
Factor 5: New Performance Measures 0.002 0.010 0.011 –0.015
(0.95) (1.86) (4.91) (–2.32)
Factor 6: Reallocation of Technical Staff –0.001 –0.015 –0.019 –0.008
(–0.44) (–2.01) (–6.51) (–1.83)
R2 0.080 0.087 0.149 0.098
N 2,673 2,676 2,676 2,006
Notes: Dependent variables are as noted in column headings. Estimates are from fixed effects regressions 
with dummy variables for month, year, and reconstruction of production sites (n = 4) to account for 
worker accommodation and learning. Controlling for the size of the production units by, e.g., hours of 
work is not possible because that information is missing in this second data set; t-statistics in parentheses.
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forms of behavior, and the results can then be horrendous” (Roberts 2010: 
125).
Conclusions
Our empirical results cast considerable doubt on the alleged benefits to 
manufacturing firms from teamwork and performance-related pay. In terms 
of productivity enhancement, we find that gains from these human resource 
policies disappear once a correction to output is made for non-useable 
scrap. A quality-adjusted measure of output does not reveal benefits from 
teamwork or performance-related pay or a combination of the two. More-
over, the impact of these practices on adjusted running time (i.e., running 
time corrected for unscheduled maintenance work) is again statistically sig-
nificant and negative. We also found some evidence of hidden costs of a 
combination of human resource management practices in the form of 
higher absence rates. Taken together, our results question the benefits of 
new human resource management practices and suggest that managers 
should devote greater consideration to potential or actual hidden costs of 
incentive-based policies.18 In our case, it appears that individual human re-
source policies can reduce absenteeism but, either singly or jointly, fail to 
raise adjusted output.
Interestingly, when our empirical results were shown to Company X, its 
management expressed surprise and launched an investigation into its 
human resource management policies. Unfortunately, the company was un-
willing to support a follow-up academic study. Nevertheless, it would be de-
sirable to undertake further empirical research to cross-check our findings 
against data from other companies, in both manufacturing and service sec-
tors, in Germany and elsewhere.
18 We agree with Kalmi, Jones, and Kauhanen (2008: 29) that econometric case studies have higher 
construct validity and internal validity than competing approaches, but there are doubts about their ex-
ternal validity.
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